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Definitions: Dealing with Categories 
Mathematically 
LARA ALCOCK, ADRIAN SIMPSON 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines 'swan' as: 
[a] large waterbird of genus Cygnus etc., with long 
flexible neck, webbed feet, and in most species snow- 
white plumage. (OED, 1982, p. 1077) 
This is not a definition in the mathematical sense, since it is 
neither possible to say with absolute certainty that every- 
thing satisfying the definition is a swan, nor that every swan 
satisfies the definition. Neither is it reasonable to assume 
that deductions made from this definition would apply to 
all swans, nor that something which is true of all swans 
could necessarily be deduced from the definition. Yet people 
have few problems thinking and reasoning about swans. 
By contrast, a mathematical definition does have the 
property that everything satisfying it belongs to the corre- 
sponding category and that everything belonging to the 
category satisfies the definition. Deductions made from the 
definitions provide us with theorems that hold for every 
member of the category and, in the context of the problems 
provided by those lecturing to first year undergraduates, 
any theorem a student is asked to prove can be deduced from 
the definitions. Yet many students have significant difficul- 
ties thinking and reasoning about mathematical concepts. 
This article explores these differences by contrasting three 
approaches to mathematical reasoning. Two of these are 
more and less sophisticated versions of strategies that we 
claim are employed in everyday situations. The third type 
is that required of undergraduates taking proof-oriented 
mathematics courses. By examining the consequences of the 
use of these approaches in a first course in real analysis we 
address the following two questions. 
1. Why is the transition to university mathematics 
difficult? 
2. Why is analysis particularly hard? 
The first section of this article introduces three terms that 
are significant in our discussions: specific object, category and 
property. We then illustrate the three reasoning strategies using 
examples from a substantial study of students' reasoning 
behaviour in analysis (Alcock, 2002). Finally, the framework 
built up from study of these examples is used to suggest rea- 
sons for student difficulties with the transition to university 
mathematics in general and with analysis in particular. 
Why is the transition to university mathema- 
tics difficult? 
In the UK context, as in many others, the transition from 
school to university mathematics could be seen as an amal- 
gam of many transitions: social transitions (from relatively 
homogeneous home environments to heterogeneous ones); 
pedagogical transitions (from a personal teaching relation- 
ship to a fairly impersonal one; from immediate feedback 
to delayed response; from clear authority relationships to 
unclear ones); content transitions (from more to less 
contextualised mathematics); philosophical transitions (from 
utilitarian to systematic viewpoints), and so on. The issues 
addressed here cross the last two transitions listed: we focus 
on the nature of the mathematical objects that students 
are asked to deal with and the ways in which they reason 
about them. 
We might begin to explore the nature of these changes in 
objects and reasoning by asking what university mathema- 
tics requires that school mathematics does not. One 
well-researched answer is 'formal proof. Other authors 
have given careful delineations of proof-related behaviour 
(e.g. Harel and Sowder, 1998) and have attributed this 
behaviour to factors such as relationship with authority and 
students' previous educational experiences. Here, the focus 
is on the cognitive origins of behaviour that is commonly 
considered incorrect or unproductive in situations requiring 
such proof. We address this by drawing together ideas from 
the cognitive psychology literature on human categorisa- 
tion and data from task-based interviews with university 
students taking their first course in real analysis. 
The framework developed in the next section describes 
different student reasoning approaches in terms of how they 
handle specific objects, categories and properties. 
We use the term 'specific object' in the sense of Sfard's 
(1991) structural notions in mathematics: mathematicians 
often think of mathematical notions as "static structure^], 
existing somewhere in space and time" (p. 4). It is difficult 
to clarify this meaning further, because of the fluidity with 
which mathematicians move between thinking of different 
constructs as objects at different times. However, in the 
restricted context of a first course in analysis, we can be 
more precise by associating its meaning with the logical 
structure of the topic. Thus, specific objects in this work 
include specific sequences, such as (1/n) or (cos(n)), specific 
series, such as X n or X l/2n, and specific real numbers, such 
as 0.999... . 
Specific objects are collected together in categories, each 
of which is usually associated with a mathematical term, 
such as 'convergent sequence'. This term is used instead of 
the more usual 'set', since an important distinction in this 
article is that between formally defined mathematical sets 
and everyday human categories. So while, formally, 'strictly 
increasing sequence' contains all and only those sequences 
in which each term strictly exceeds its predecessor, we shall 
see that not all students appear to think about such categories 
in this way. 
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An object may have properties and, indeed, all the spe- 
cific objects in a category may have properties in common. 
For example, a sequence might have the property of mono- 
tonicity and every object in the category of convergent 
sequences definately has the property of being bounded. 
These terms allow us to highlight what university mathe- 
matics requires of students that school mathematics does 
not. School mathematics primarily involves calculations 
performed upon specific mathematical objects. For example, 
students are required to integrate a specific function or solve 
a specific differential equation. Even the few proofs encoun- 
tered at this level (in the U.K. context) have this property: 
students are asked to prove by induction that this formula 
gives the sum of the first n terms of this series or prove that 
this trigonometric identity is equivalent to that one. 
Proof at university goes beyond this. Work with specific 
objects is still required: students are asked to find the limit 
of a given sequence or to find the rational number that is 
represented by a given infinite decimal. However, they must 
now also work with entire categories of objects. This might 
involve showing that a specific object is an element of 
a category - for example, that a given sequence is conver- 
gent - or showing that a whole category is contained within 
another category - for example, that all convergent sequen- 
ces are bounded. It might be argued that at least the first of 
these is essentially equivalent to a calculation on a specific 
object. Logically this may be the case, but we will argue that 
psychologically it is not 
We will build up a framework describing how different 
strategies for reasoning about whole categories develop 
and how these differ from mathematical notions of proof and 
deduction. In particular, we will outline three distinct stra- 
tegies. Two of these rely on the use of a 'prototype': a 
representation that an individual considers prototypical of 
the category and which might be seen to correspond to an 
individual's schema for an object-concept (Skemp, 1979) 
or to a frame with default values instantiated (Minsky, 
1975). The last strategy, at least formally, abandons the use 
of prototypes in favour of definitions. 
Briefly, these three strategies are given below. 
1. Generalising. Students begin with a prototype, 
inspect it in order to evaluate or generate a conjec- 
ture and generalise their conclusions to the whole 
category. 
2. Property abstraction. Students abstract a salient 
property from their prototype and make deductions 
(intended for the whole category) based on this. 
3. Working from definitions. Students use agreed 
defining properties, making deductions (for the 
whole category) based on these. 
Generalising 
Wendy is typical of students who appear to use the first stra- 
tegy. In these excerpts, she is working on the following 
question during week 9 of a real analysis course (described 
in more detail in Alcock and Simpson, 2001). 
When does X 
-^p- converge? 
Justify your answer as fully as possible. 
Wendy begins by expanding the given series and identify- 
ing a special case of it as a familiar object. This also reminds 
her of a test that might be useful. 
W: Erm, just, if x is bigger than or equal to one then the 
series will be erm ... minus jc, plus x squared over 
two, minus x cubed over three, plus x to the four 
over four and then continuing on. 
W: If jc is one, it'll be, minus ... we've done that, that 
converges, doesn't it. Because we did the one 
plus a half plus a third plus a quarter plus a fifth 
doesn't converge yet ... when you have the alter- 
nating ... what was that alternating series test? 
She and her interview partner Xavier establish similar 
known results for other special cases and Wendy then con- 
siders intermediate values. 
W: Erm, if ... if you take x as between nought and one, 
say x equal to a half, erm ... and put it into the 
series, you'd get minus a half, plus a half squared 
over two, minus a half cubed over three, and so on 
X: So that's going to be smaller. 
W: Erm, the terms are decreasing in size, so ... xn is 
bigger than xn+1 [she misreads notation here] 
X: And tending to zero. 
Pause (writing). 
W: Converges? « 
In this instance, Wendy is using X -^- as a generic exam- 
ple or 'prototype' in reasoning about a category of objects. 
She believes her reasoning will generalise and, in this 
instance, her final answer is correct. Her work shows a solid 
relational understanding of the material: she is able to switch 
sensibly between representations of familiar objects, iden- 
tify potentially useful results, make qualitative comparisons 
between different objects and organise her results. 
In this situation, Wendy's strategy is efficient and suc- 
cessful. We argue that she is working in exactly the way that 
one works with human cultural categories. Rosch's (1978) 
work indicates that such categories have structure that could 
not derive from a 'classical' interpretation of categories as 
mathematical sets. For example, some (perhaps most) cate- 
gories do not have well defined boundaries - there are 
no criteria for deciding absolutely who belongs to the cate- 
gory 'tall man' or to the category 'chair'. Similarly, some 
members of the category 'bird' have clearer categorical 
membership than others; in a U.K. context for example, a 
robin is more clearly a bird than a turkey is. 
The latter phenomenon is known as a prototype effect. 
Within a culture, ratings for the extent to which a member of 
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a category is considered a 'good example' are consistent 
across various experiments. This, in itself, does not consti- 
tute any particular theory of the use of categories in 
cognitive processing (Lakoff, 1987), but individuals must 
somehow cope in a society where categories are of this 
nature. We have claimed elsewhere (Alcock and Simpson, 
1999) that a natural way to reason about categories under 
these circumstances is to use the general cognitive strategy 
(illustrated in Figure 1 below): the individual assesses a con- 
jecture by evaluating its validity for a prototype and draws 
a conclusion by generalising to the category as a whole. 
Others have accounted for human deductive capacity in a 
similar way (e.g. Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991). 
Figure 1 
In these terms, Wendy uses 2 K2n' as a 'good example' of 
the category she was asked to investigate and makes (cor- 
rect) statements about the whole of the category by 
examining this and similar prototypes. While this strategy 
yields a correct answer in this case, at no point does Wendy 
verify the fact that her conclusion really does hold for all 
values of x within the range she is considering. The pro- 
blems associated with this omission can be seen in an extract 
from her earlier attempt at the following question, posed in 
an interview in week 7 of the same course. 
Consider a sequence (an). Which of the following is 
true? 
a) (an) is bounded => (an) is convergent; 
b) (an) is convergent => (an) is bounded; 
c) (an) is convergent <=» (an) is bounded; 
d) none of the above. 
Justify your answer. 
In this case, the difference between Wendy's notion of jus- 
tification and mathematical proof becomes clear. Wendy 
begins as follows (I = interviewer). 
W: Well if it converges, you get closer and closer ... 
Pause (drawing). 
W: Is that enough to, like, justify it ... a little diagram, 
what have you? 
I: Well, I'd like you to prove it, if you can. 
W: Oh dear! (laughs) Oh right, well, if a to the n is 
increasing ... (writing) ... then it's bounded ... 
After this prompt for proof, her attempt at this is not much 
more sophisticated: she describes her picture, but provides 
no more indication of the logical necessity of her conclusion. 
W: It's convergent [draws a monotonie increasing con- 
vergent sequence] ... yes so if it's convergent it's 
always ... or ... say it could be the other way round 
it could be, going down this way [draws a mono- 
tonic decreasing convergent sequence]. It con- 
verges, so it's always above that limit. 
In effect, Wendy is offering what Harel and Sowder (1998) 
would call a perceptual proof, one which is inadequate due 
to a failure to look beyond features of the particular image 
she has in mind (see also Presmeg, 1986). In fact, it proves 
difficult to persuade her to consider convergent sequences 
that are not monotonie. Whether this occurs because she 
does not think that there are any such sequences or whether 
she believes them to be in some way less important is not 
clear. In any case, she is not willing to move beyond her 
strategy of examining a prototype and generalising. 
Property abstraction 
The next, more sophisticated, reasoning strategy still relies 
on prototypes. However, rather than making a direct gener- 
alisation from the prototype to the whole category, we see 
students attempting to abstract properties from their proto- 
type and work with those properties to justify a conclusion. 
Cary's initial approach to the week 7 convergence/bounded 
problem is similar to Wendy's. He establishes an answer 
using generalization from visual prototypes, making the 
sketch given in Figure 2 and describing his intentions. 
Figure 2: Cary 's sketch of convergent sequences 
C: I've drawn ... er ... convergent sequences, such that 
... I don't know, we have er ... curves ... er ... 
approaching a limit but never quite reaching it, 
from above and below, and oscillating either side. 
I think that's pretty much what I've done. I was 
trying to think if there's a sequence ... which con- 
verges yet is unbounded both sides. But there isn't 
one. Because that would be ... because then it 
wouldn't converge. Erm ... so I'll say b) is true. 
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Though initially he is still working with prototypes, we can 
see a difference from Wendy's work. Cary considers more 
examples, making explicit his inclusion of non-monotonic 
sequences. Following this, he tries to abstract properties 
from his prototypes in order to formulate arguments, evalu- 
ating each candidate property by performing a counter- 
example check to see whether there are any cases for which 
this would not be valid. 
C: If it converges ... that has to be ... well I don't 
suppose you can say bounded. It doesn't have to 
be monotonie. Erm ... 
C: Yes, I'm trying to think if there's, like ... if you can 
say the first term is, like, the highest or lowest 
bound but it's not. Because then you could just 
make a sequence which happens to go ... to do a 
loop up, or something like that. 
Finding an appropriate property proves difficult, which is 
not surprising since it took the mathematical community a 
considerable time to formulate a property that would ade- 
quately capture the essence of convergence of sequences. 
Tom, who in many ways works like Cary, does find such 
a property in working on this question, and he attempts a 
deduction from his choice. 
T: ... If an tends to big A, okay ... Then erm ... an does 
not tend to infinity, therefore there is a bound, a, 
lower than infinity ... 
Tom is correct in asserting that since the sequence is 
convergent it cannot tend to infinity. However, his coun- 
terexample checking is not as thorough as Cary's and this 
means that his deduction is not valid: a sequence that does 
not tend to infinity may nevertheless fail to have an upper 
bound (although it seems likely that a student's prototype 
for this type of sequence would have an upper bound). 
Nonetheless, this gives us an overview of the abstraction- 
and-deduction strategy, which is contrasted with the gener- 
alisation strategy in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Abstraction and deduction 
Our use of the term abstraction differs slightly here from 
that described by Hard and Tall (1991), in which they say 
that properties of objects are isolated. Here, the student's 
prototype need not be a specific object and a property 
abstracted from the individual's prototype is not necessarily 
isolated from it for them, although it may appear to be so 
for a listener. 
In any case, abstraction-and-deduction yields more math- 
ematically acceptable conclusions than direct generalisation, 
although the latter remains favoured in everyday reasoning. 
This is no coincidence and the difference is related to the 
goals of any piece of argumentation. In mathematics, as in 
any technical field, accurate communication is necessary. 
Participants must be sure that they intend to indicate the 
same objects when using a category word. Hence, while they 
may think using their individual prototypes, they communi- 
cate by abstracting verbally formulated properties and 
arguing in terms of them. 
In everyday situations, this type of precision is not usually 
necessary and may be a hindrance to cognitive efficiency. 
In their own reasoning, individuals may generalise directly 
from a prototype without needing to consider explicitly what 
properties of this prototype make a conclusion valid. In 
cases where communication is required, the reasoner relies 
in general on the other party's prototype being similar to 
their own or on citing specific cases and inviting agreement 
with the generalisation. In effect, they attempt to communi- 
cate by sharing their ideas of prototypes rather than of entire 
categories. Most of the time this communication will suc- 
ceed, so the approach is quick and efficient, and is usually 
valued over guaranteed accuracy in everyday reasoning 
(Balacheff, 1986). 
So we might conclude that Cary is engaging in better math- 
ematical thinking than Wendy. However, as noted above, he 
finds it difficult to choose a property that will allow him to 
construct a satisfactory argument. He rejects the assump- 
tion of monotonicity and the possibility that the first term 
of the sequence must be one of the bounds. A mathematician 
watching this behaviour would recognise that the student 
needs to introduce the definition of convergence. In fact, 
with some prompting, Cary is able to do this and to use the 
definition to outline an appropriate, though incomplete, 
argument. This is still very much tied to a picture for him - 
in a similar way to the work of the student Chris discussed in 
Pinto and Tall (2002). Cary's diagram is given in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Cary 's illustration of his definition-based argument 
C: Yes, your n0 ... that could just be called your n0 
instead, so going back to your definition up there, 
there exists this point here, such that after that 
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point, i.e. when n is greater than n0, the sequence 
... that statement there won't be less than any 
epsilon which you just happen to pick ... And so it's 
... and so the upper bound - so because there's 
finitely many terms before n0, then er ... your upper 
bound will either be plus or minus epsilon, or it'll 
be the maximum of those finite terms beforehand. 
Working with definitions 
While Cary can work with definitions, this is not his first 
approach; it requires several prompts to persuade him to 
write down a reasonably complete definition and to use this 
in preference to his original strategy. By contrast, in answer- 
ing the same question, Greg shows immediate recourse to 
the definition and rapidly outlines an argument. 
G: Right. It's easiest to use the definition. Just say 
definition of ... of convergence is that eventually 
... Okay! ... The definition of convergence is even- 
tually you'll find epsilon such that ... for all n 
bigger than big N, epsilon - no an minus a is 
smaller than epsilon. So you've got it bounded 
between ... an is ... a plus epsilon ... a minus epsilon 
even. And a plus epsilon. And for ... n bigger than 
big N. And for all n smaller than big iV, you know 
that an has a minimum, and maximum because it's 
finite. Er ... 
This approach is radically different from those seen so far. 
Greg does not generalise directly from a prototype (as 
Wendy does), nor does he attempt to abstract appropriate 
properties from a prototype in order to make deductions (as 
Cary does). His approach does use a property - but it is the 
defining property of convergence of a sequence. 
The result is a fundamental difference in the nature of the 
category the students work with. For both Wendy and Cary, 
the category is pre-existing (and non-classical) and for Cary 
the properties of the category follow from it. Greg's 
approach to property use, however, goes beyond Cary's by 
inverting the property/category relationship: the defining 
property determines the category. 
Since a definition is precisely a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for category membership, a mathemat- 
ically-defined category has a fixed boundary and no 'better' 
members. So, once a definition is chosen, both the original 
objects and any individual's prototype constructed through 
experience with those objects, become secondary in impor- 
tance to the property itself (cfi Gray et ai, 1999). This is 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
The process of choosing such properties is institution- 
alised within the mathematical community. While definitions 
such as those used by Greg can often be traced to properties 
abstracted from an individual's prototype, one function of 
the community is to debate which of these properties best 
capture what is common to those objects in the category 
under discussion (Lakatos, 1976). This is a worthwhile 
enterprise, because making such decisions facilitates com- 
munication on a large scale by making reasoning in the 
subject systematic (Bell, 1976). Greg's work reflects the 
results of this debate in analysis and his appropriate use of 
Figure 5: One property is chosen as the definition, precisely 
determining the mathematical category 
the definition means that any correct deductions he makes 
will be valid for all members of the mathematical category 
of convergent sequences. 
We do not argue that mathematicians think solely in terms 
of definitions, although our particular example happens 
to show no evidence of the use of a prototype. Indeed, pro- 
totypes can remain vital: Tail's (1991) description of 
Poincaré's thinking and Thurston's (1990) self-reflection 
demonstrate the importance of prototypes as a source of both 
conjecture and guidance for the direction of deduction. There 
is no inconsistency here: individuals can learn to formulate 
arguments within the logical structure of mathematics while 
still reasoning using the same psychological strategies as in 
other contexts. Indeed, we argue that the inclination to work 
from definitions is a 'prefix' imposed on general thinking 
skills (the 'rigour prefix', described in Alcock and Simpson, 
1999). Mathematicians might think in terms of prototypes, 
but they are aware that, in order to ensure universal validity 
for their arguments, they must eventually formulate these in 
terms of appropriate definitions. 
A communication breakdown 
Although students are rarely involved in selecting defini- 
tional properties (Harel and Tall, 1991), working from those 
dictated by their teachers might in principle be expected to 
make their task easier. Proof tasks in beginning advanced- 
level courses are usually quite straightforward in structure: 
in order to show that an object is a member of a category, 
one checks that it satisfies the definition; and in order to 
show that a conjecture is true of all objects in a category, one 
makes deductions from the definition. Hence, while formu- 
lating the detail of such deductions may be difficult, the 'top 
level' (Leron, 1985) or 'proof framework' (Selden and 
Selden, 1995) is often very simple. 
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However, as demonstrated by the excerpts from inter- 
views with Wendy and Cary, and as noted elsewhere in the 
literature (Moore, 1994), the shift from "show that x is X" 
to "show that x satisfies the definition of X" is not one that 
all students readily make. The status of definitions in math- 
ematics seems to elude them and this is the source of our 
earlier claim that, psychologically, showing that an object 
is a member of a category is quite different from perform- 
ing calculations on this object. 
To be more accurate, we might say that what eludes the 
students is the distinction between a dictionary definition as 
a description of pre-existing objects and a mathematical 
definition as the chosen basis for deduction, one which 
serves to determine the nature of the objects. The result is 
that a breakdown in communication occurs when a lecturer 
gives the student a definition. In a non-technical context, 
good students do not simply learn a definition, they use 
further experience with examples to deepen their under- 
standing of the concept. 
So when a lecturer provides a mathematical definition, 
expecting the student to work with it in future, the student 
may try to build or refine a prototype for use in this non- 
technical way and perhaps abandon the definition once this 
is accomplished (Vinner, 1991). If the lecturer also provides 
examples, intending them to be illustrative, the student may 
even construct their prototype on the basis of experience 
with them, ignoring the definition altogether. This contrast 
between using a dictionary definition to construct a proto- 
type and using a mathematical definition to generate a 
category is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Contrasting the use of dictionary and mathematical 
definitions 
Crucially, it may not be apparent to either party that this 
communication breakdown has occurred. In cases where 
the technical meaning of a term is similar to - or perhaps, 
derived from - the everyday meaning, there will be a large 
overlap between a student's idea of what is in the category 
and the formal version. Hence, there may be very few cases 
where conflict seems to arise and both student and teacher 
may feel that they are communicating successfully. 
Hence, one reason for the difficulty of the transition to 
university mathematics is that certain reasoning strategies 
are inadequate when applied to university mathematics, 
although they may be efficient and successful in non-tech- 
nical contexts and in the kind of reasoning with specific 
objects required by school mathematics. The student must 
learn to override these strategies with the new approach of 
working from the dictated definitions, but since the role of 
mathematical definitions usually remains below the level of 
consciousness of working mathematicians, this is rarely 
communicated and may be far from transparent. 
Why is analysis hard? 
We can now offer an explanation of why real analysis, of the 
topics studied at the beginning of a mathematics degree, 
proves particularly difficult. Definitions in analysis are 
logically complicated; they often involve multiple mixed 
quantifiers (Dubinsky, Elterman and Gong, 1988). However, 
teachers of analysis also typically make use of visual repre- 
sentations of objects and results. Such representations are 
useful in building prototypes, such as those seen in use by 
Wendy and Cary. These prototypes are in turn conducive to 
arguing by direct generalisation: it is easy to convince one- 
self that an increasing sequence which is bounded above 
must converge, without recourse to abstracting properties 
or formulating algebraic arguments. 
Indeed, considerable exasperation may result when stu- 
dents' prototypes provide them with a strong feeling of 
intuitive intrinsic conviction, but they are asked to justify 
their assertions precisely (Fischbein, 1982). The requirement 
to use the complex definitions means that they are often in 
a position from which they must prove something they con- 
sider obvious using algebraic formulations which make 
them feel insecure (Gray et a/., 1999). 
Comparing analysis with other beginning university sub- 
jects such as group theory shows how much more significant 
the problem is in analysis. Definitions in group theory may 
be long, but they are logically simpler than those in analysis. 
Other types of representation are less readily available or, 
at least, less often taught in the early part of the course. 
Hence, in group theory, it is likely that more students will 
produce work that competently makes use of the definitions. 
This does not mean that they necessarily understand the 
structure of this topic or the role that definitions play within 
it, only that these are easier to handle and that they have no 
obvious other option. 
Indeed, it would be interesting to investigate the conse- 
quences of the difference for student complaints. Since the 
visual representations used in analysis occupy an interme- 
diate position between realistic pictures and verbal/symbolic 
representations (Gibson, 1998), these appear more concrete. 
We may find that complaints are distributed so that analysis 
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attracts more comments like: "It's obvious, but I don't know 
how to prove it" and group theory more comments like "It's 
just too abstract". 
Thus, in analysis, the availability of visual representations 
means that more students initially have access to a way of 
coming to understand the concepts. The understanding gained 
in this way means that they feel less need to engage seriously 
with the complex algebraically-expressed properties from 
which the formal categories are constructed. So, paradoxi- 
cally, analysis may be difficult not only because the material 
is complex per se, but because it is initially less 'abstract' than 
other beginning subjects in advanced mathematics. 
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